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CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS APPLICABLE TO
VOTER REGISTRATION CLOSING DATES
Judicial pronouncements during the last decade on the relation-
ship between the state, the voter, and the Federal Constitution
have circumscribed the power states formerly enjoyed to impose
restrictions on availability of the franchise. Nevertheless, all
states but one maintain voter registration systems,1 one element
of which is a closing date which cuts off registration at a stipulated
point in time prior to election day.2 While in a statistical sense
large scale de facto disfranchisement results from the use of
closing dates, 3 a distinct issue is presented as to whether this
disfranchisement is of a type that is proscribed by the Federal
Constitution.
This article considers the nature and extent of disfranchisement
that results from closing dates, the constitutional restrictions and
standards that apply, and possible judicial and legislative solutions
to this problem.
I. NATURE AND EXTENT OF DISFRANCHISEMENT CAUSED
BY VOTER REGISTRATION CLOSING DATES
Registration closing dates work a de facto disfranchisement in
two distinct ways. First, to the extent that registration prior to a
closing date makes voting an arduous task for the citizen, it deters
his exercise of the franchise. In the abstract, the average citizen
can be assumed to view registration and voting along rational
cost-benefit lines; 4 his decision whether to register is made by
balancing the "costs" of complying with registration requirements
and the "benefits" he perceives as deriving from the right to vote.
I See Doty, The Texas Voter Registration Law and the Due Process Clause, 7 HOus-
TON L. REV. 163, 202- 12, tabs. 1-3 (1969), and C. SMITH, VOTING AND ELECTION LAWS
65-99, app. (1960), fora summary of state systems.
2 The closing dates for those states having a voter registration system are set forth in the
Appendix. The minimum closing period is ten days (Oklahoma), the maximum four months
(Mississippi).
Other elements of some voter registration systems are provisions that registration may
occur only on certain days (see Appendix infra), and provisions that voters must
re-register each year to maintain their voting status (see Doty, supra note 1).
3 See text accompanying notes I1- 15 infra.
4 This conceptual framework has been adopted in Kelley, Ayers & Bowen, Registration
and Voting: Putting First Things First, 61 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 359 (1967) (hereinafter
cited as Kelley).
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Obtaining information on the registration system and then com-
plying with the requirements thereof may involve a good deal of
inconvenience as well as a loss of income if the citizen is away
from his job or business. 5 At some point these costs may become
so great that the citizen simply decides to forfeit the benefits
accompanying the right to vote.
Second, in some instances closing dates operate as a form of
durational residency requirement6 insofar as they exclude voters
who move into the jurisdiction after the closing date has passed. 7
In this respect, closing dates are analogous to the usual durational
residency requirements 8 and occasionally invoked special condi-
tions precedent to voting such as property ownership. 9 Com-
pliance with such requirements hinges upon more than a citizen's
cost-benefit analysis. If a citizen moves into the jurisdiction after
the closing date or does not meet the durational residency require-
ment, he will be precluded from voting. If a citizen does not own
property, the only way in which he will be able to vote in an
election limited to property owners is to acquire property himself.
In short, the potential voter faces a matrix of requirements, not
the least of which are closing dates, that he must satisfy before
casting his ballot. Access to the polls under these systems is not
5 Id. at 360-61.
6 Durational residency statutes require that a citizen reside within the jurisdiction for a
specified period of time before he becomes eligible to vote. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 168.492 (1967), as amended, (Supp. 1971), and N.Y. ELECTION LAW § 150
(McKinney 1964), as amended, (McKinney Supp. 197 1).
7 Closing dates only operate as de facto residency requirements in a limited number of
instances. For example, where the state has a county or precinct residence requirement
that is shorter than the closing period, voters moving between two points in the same state
would be disfranchised by the closing requirement, although they would meet the state's
residence requirements. E.g., NEV. REV. STAT. 88 293.485 and 293.560 (1969). However,
NEV. REV. STAT. § 293.490 (1969) permits voters in this situation to vote in their former
county or precinct. The same situation would obtain if a state had no residency require-
ment.
8 For a discussion of the problems presented by durational residency requirements from
a demographic standpoint, see Schmidhauser, Residency Requirements for Voting and the
Tensions of a Mobile Society, 61 MICH. L. REV. 823 (1963): see generally Note, Dura-
tional Residency Requirements in State Elections: Blumstein v. Ellington, 46 IND. L.J.
222 (197 I); Note, The Impact and Constitutionality of Voter Residence Requirements as
Applied to Certain Intrastate Movers, 43 IND. L.J. 901 (1968).
Many state durational residence requirements have come under attack in the courts on
the ground that they violate equal protection. See, e.g., Andrews v. Cody, 327 F.Supp.
793 (three judge court, M.D.N.C. 1971), appeal docketed, 40 U.S.L.W. 3290 (Nov. 6,
1971) (No. 71-628), holding the North Carolina one year residence requirement invalid as
to local elections. The opinion reviews many recent federal cases dealing with the issue.
Id. at 794.
9 However, these have almost uniformly been held unconstitutional as infringements on
the right to vote, Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (only
owner or lessee of real property or a parent of school children allowed to vote in school
board election): Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969) (property ownership a
prerequisite for voting in a municipal utility bond election); City of Phoenix v. Kolod-
ziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970) (property ownership required for electors in general obligation
bond election).
Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 5:2
easy.10 Although no available data demonstrate exactly how many
persons fail to vote solely on account of registration closing dates,
from what data are available, some estimates can be ventured.
One group of students of voting behavior has estimated that a
decrease in the period between the close of registration and elec-
tion day from one month to one week would increase registration
by approximately 3.6 percent.'1 Such an increase would be partic-
ularly noteworthy in view of the statistical correspondence be-
tween increased registration and increased voting.' 2
In those states which express the closing date in terms of a
fixed number of days, the average closing date is thirty-three days
before the election.' 3 Advancing this average from approximately
one month to one week could be expected to yield a significant
increase in the numbers of those able to vote on election day.' 4
10 For a graphic presentation of this matrix, Nee Doty, supra note 1, at 202. See also
Note, Election Laws as Legal Roadblocks to Voting, 55 IOWA L. REV. 616 (1970).
'1 As this group states:
A more striking finding is the extremely strong relationship between the date
at which registration rolls are closed and the percentage of the population of
voting age that is registered .... [Analysis] implies that extending the closing
date from say, one month to one week prior to election day would tend to
increase the percentage of the population registered by about 3.6 percent.
For politicians, varying the closing date for registration would thus appear to
be a very effective way in which to manipulate the size of the potential
electorate.
Kelley, supra note 4, at 367.
The Kelley study is based on an analysis of statistical data of the 1960 elections for
approximately one hundred cities. The limited nature of this study may undermine its
applicability to present voter systems, especially because since 1960 many more states
have moved to permanent registration systems. Furthermore, the study employs regression
analysis which makes no attempt to determine in fact what effect reducing closing dates
would have on registration; rather, the analysis seeks to explain differences in voting and
registration between cities in terms of factors such as closing dates.
12 Kelley observed that "if the percentage of population of voting age registered to vote
in city A was one percent higher than in city B, then the percentage of the population
actually voting in city A was, on the average, almost exactly one percent higher than in city
B." Id. at 362 (emphasis added). In 1970, there were 120,701,000 persons of voting
age in the United States. Of these, 75,876,000 were registered to vote. U.S. BUREAU OF
THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1971, at 364-65. If the
Kelley analysis is correct, one could project from these statistics that the effect of moving
closing dates back from one month to one week would have been to increase registrations
by three to four million voters nationally with an increase in the number of votes cast equal
to about 80 percent of the number of newly registered votes. Kelley, supra note 4, at 362.
13 This computation is based upon material set forth in the Appendix, infra.
14See notes I I and 12 supra. On the general subject of what impact more reasonable
closing dates might be expected to have, another observer has estimated that "In]on-voting
by two or three percent of the population [in November elections] is associated
with ... September closing dates .... W. MILLER, MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION ON REGISTRATION AND VOTING PARTICIPATION, cited in Kelley, supra note
4, at 367 n. 35. In Beare v. Smith, 321 F.Supp. 1100 (three judge court, S.D. Texas 1971),
the panel voided the Texas annual re-registration statute which permitted registration only
during a four month period ending January 31 of each year and covering all elections for
approximately the next twelve months. The court noted that a professor at the University
of Texas had testified that in Texas
registration would increase about 2.7% for each month closer to the general
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Interestingly, available data suggest that the length of closing
dates has greater statistical significance on voting than the length
of durational residency requirements. 15 Thus, while only a series
of oblique statistical estimates can be called upon, it is at least
logically inferrable that voter registration closing dates act to
prevent thousands of otherwise qualified voters from voting.
II. ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS GOVERNING
VOTER REGISTRATION CLOSING DATES
Under our federal system, the power to establish qualifications
for voters in state and national elections resides in the states.'
6
Furthermore, the states are authorized to prescribe the proce-
dures and details of elections, subject only to the power of Con-
gress to make laws regulating the time and manner of holding
elections for United States Senators and Representatives.' 7 The
post-Civil War amendments 8 restructured the state-federal bal-
ance of power in the voting rights area. In the early years after
passage of the fourteenth amendment, the courts held that the
states were free to impose any "reasonable" restrictions on the
availability of the franchise so long as they avoided arbitrary and
irrational discrimination between individuals.19 Recently, how-
ever, the Supreme Court has regarded this traditional con-
election that the closing date for registration is moved. This means that when
registration is closed thirty days prior to the general election, having been
open for the eight months preceding that closing date, 1,000,365 additional
persons would have been registered had the change been made in 1968.
Id. at 1104.
15 "We found that differences among cities in rates of registration were not significantly
related to differences in the length of residence in states and localities required of voters.
This finding is surprising." Kelley, supra note 4, at 368 (emphasis added). It should be
noted that this finding cannot be said to stand for the proposition that fewer people are
being disfranchised by residency requirements than by closing dates. It merely indicates
that as applied to various localities no significant relationship exists between the length of a
residency requirement and registration rates.
16 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2. But see Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970), holding
that Congress may regulate the age qualifications of voters in federal elections.
17 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 4. This limited view of congressional power over elections and
voting is expanded, however, by the congressional power to make substantive findings of
violations of equal protection. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), and
Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
18 U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV, XV.
'9 E.g., in Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621, 632 (1904), a Maryland statute requiring that
new residents delcare their intent to make Maryland their residence as a condition
precedent to registration for voting was held to be entirely within the state's power to
prscribe non-discriminatory requirements for voters. More recently, in Lassiter v. North-
ampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959), the Supreme Court held that it was
reasonable for a state to enact a literacy test as a condition precedent to voter registration
and that this classification was entirely within the state power. Compare Katzenbach v.
Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
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stitutional analysis under the equal protection clause as in-
appropriate when applied to voting rights. 20
In a democratic society where major governmental deci-
sion-making and accountability are vested in elected officials,
voting plays a key role in the functioning of the entire political
system. The right to vote is important in our governmental system
because it is "preservative of other basic civil and political
rights." 2 ' From this it follows that restrictions on free exercise of
the franchise can result in an erosion of all rights including voting
rights. The obvious, if circular, result can be a disfranchisement of
groups which then have no political representation with which to
remedy their exclusion from the political process. This theme has
recurred in many of the voting rights cases of the past decade. 22
This article attempts to distill the teaching of two competing
lines of cases in order to determine with reasonable specificity
that standard of constitutional equal protection which is applic-
able in the closing date context. It necessarily leaves to the courts
the difficult task of applying this standard to complex factual
situations that will differ from one jurisdiction to the next. Know-
ing what the proper test is at least allows courts to concentrate on
those facts that are constitutionally relevant.
A. Evolution of the Constitutional Standards
Because the franchise is a constitutionally protected right, 23 the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment has been
held to apply to state restraints on voting.24 In creating a closing
date a state legislature classifies citizens on the basis of when they
choose to register, that is, the state gives the right to vote to those
2 0 Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), discussed in text accom-
panying notes 38-41 infra.
21 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964), reh. denied, 379 U.S. 870 (1964). See
also Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886), where the Court first advanced the
notion that "voting ... is regarded as a fundamental political right, because preservative of
all rights."2 2 See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969), where the
Court held that New York could not make property ownership a precondition for voting in
school elections. "[W]hen the challenge to the statute is ... a challenge of this basic
assumption [that an election fairly represents the voice of the people], the assumption can
no longer serve as the basis for presuming constitutionality." id. at 628.
2 In Reynolds v. Sims, the Court stated: "Undeniably, the Constitution of the United
States protects the rights of all qualified citizens to vote in state as well as in federal
elections." 377 U.S. at 554.24 See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665 (1966):
For it is enough to say that once the franchise is granted to the electorate,
lines may not be drawn which are inconsistent with the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ... [Tihe right of suffrage is subject to
the imposition of state standards which are not discriminatory ....
[VOL. 5:2
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who register before the closing date, while it denies the vote to
those who attempt to register after the closing date. The con-
stitutional issue then is whether a classification which withholds
the franchise from those who register after the closing date denies
those precluded from voting equal protection of the laws.
To resolve this issue, a formulation of a constitutional standard
of equal protection which courts can apply in determining whether
a state is violating constitutional rights in its regulation of the
franchise is necessary. Departing from the traditional equal pro-
tection analysis, the major voting rights opinions of the past
decade have evolved a standard against which state closing dates
must be measured.
For reasons of policy, states have created classifications in
granting the franchise. For example, many state statutes provide
that felons and illiterates may not vote,25 and several state laws
require that one be a resident of the jurisdiction for six months
prior to election day. 26 In answer to the charge that such a
classification violates equal protection, courts have traditionally
stated that only a rational basis need be found to justify the
legislative classification.27 While the rhetoric of these earlier cases
at times reappears, 28 modern holdings have evolved a more rigor-
ous standard for application where the franchise is involved.
In Reynolds v. Sims, 29 the Alabama legislative apportionment
scheme was challenged on equal protection grounds for weighting
the votes of rural citizens more heavily than those of their urban
counterparts. In its opinion the Court discussed voting as a "fun-
damental right" 30 and noted that any restriction on that right must
be "carefully and meticulously scrutinized." 3' However, while the
Court injected this new language, it invalidated the apportionment
plan on the ground that it was a discriminatory and irrational
scheme that made the value of one's vote depend solely upon his
25 See, e.g., N.Y. ELECTION LAW § 152 (McKinney 1964): TEXAS ELECTION CODE art.
5.01 (1967).26 See, e.g., MICH. CONST. art. 2, § I; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 168.492 (Supp.
1971).2 7 See, e.g., Drueding v. Devlin, 234 F.Supp. 721 (D. Md. 1964), aff'd mem., 380 U.S.
125 (1965), where a Maryland durational residency requirement was upheld on the
grounds that it was not "so unreasonable as to amount to a prohibited discrimination,"
since the requirement might have been enacted to protect the voting process against fraud
and insure that citizens would have an interest in the election. 234 F.Supp. at 723-24. See
generally, Developments in the Law, Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065 (1969).
2 8 See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577 (1964), reh. denied, 379 U.S. 870
1964).
29377 U.S. 533, reh. denied, 379 U.S. 870 (1964).
30377 U.S. at 561-62.
31 Id. at 562.
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place of residence.32 The Court employed a similar analysis in
Carrington v. Rash,33 which involved a Texas statute prohibiting
any member of the armed forces from voting in a Texas election
unless that person had been a Texas resident before entering the
service. Carrington alleged that Texas, in conclusively presuming
that he lacked residency for registration purposes, regardless of
whether he met current state qualifications for the franchise, vio-
lated his right to equal protection of the laws. While the Court
recognized a valid state interest in insuring that all voters were
bona fide residents of the jurisdiction,3 4 discrimination on the
basis of occupation was held to be an impermissible means for
advancing that interest.3 5 The Court's conclusion that the Texas
statutory residence provision was not "reasonable in light of its
purpose" 3 6 follows from the fact that excluding citizens by oc-
cupational criteria does not insure that all bona fide residents and
only bona fide residents will be allowed to vote.3 7 In effect, the
Court found the Texas provision to be unreasonably broad in its
sweep.
In Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections,38 the Court faced the
question whether a Virginia poll tax violated equal protection. Mr.
Justice Douglas for the majority noted that "[w]e have long been
mindful that where fundamental rights and liberties are asserted
under the equal protection clause, classifications which might
invade or restrain them must be closely scrutinized and carefully
confined." 39 However, in holding that the tax violated equal pro-
tection, he concluded that "[w]ealth or fee paying has, in our
view, no relation to voting qualifications; the right to vote is too
precious, too fundamental to be so conditioned or burdened."40
Therefore, Harper, read in the light of Reynolds, suggests a more
rigorous analysis under the equal protection clause than the typi-
cal rational relation test.4 1 Where voting rights are involved and
an infringement of the right is alleged, the Court will not afford
3
2 1d. at 568: "Furthermore, the existing apportionment, and also to a lesser extent the
[proposed] apportionment, presented little more than crazy quilts, completely lacking in
rationality and could be found invalid on that basis alone."
- 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
34 Id. at 93-94.
35 Id. at 96.
36 Id. at 93, quoting from McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964).
37 Such a classification is unreasonable in excluding possibly bona fide residents of
Texas from voting because presumably no member of the armed forces can establish
residence while in service, even though a similarly situated citizen not in the armed forces
could do so.
38 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
39 Id. at 670.
40 Id.
41 See cases cited in note 27 supra.
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legislatures the former presumption of reasonableness and validity
of classification; rather, these classifications will come under close
scrutiny in order to determine whether in fact they advance any
legitimate state interest.
Arguably, in asserting that any alleged infringement of the right
to vote must be meticulously scrutinized, the Court has not
changed its basic equal protection test. In one sense the Court is
reiterating old language and ideas: in Carrington and Harper the
Court struck down voting restrictions on the ground that because
the lines drawn by the states bore no relationship to their legiti-
mate interests in the franchise, the classification was not ratio-
nal.42 On the other hand, the Court is using new language and
ideas: where an infringement of so fundamental a right as voting is
alleged, the Court will subject the state's justification for its clas-
sification to meticulous scrutiny. No longer will the Court be
willing to presume that a classification is valid. 43 In retrospect it
seems fair to conclude that Carrington and Harper together in-
dicate a change in the equal protection analysis to be used in
voting rights cases.
With its decision in Williams v. Rhodes44 the Court limited a
state's power to restrict the availability of a position on the ballot.
Some months before the 1968 election, the American In-
dependent Party sought a place on Ohio's printed ballot. State law
provided that a minority party could only be put on the ballot by
presenting a petition signed by at least 15 percent of the number
of voters in the last election and by meeting other requirements.
Neither the Democratic nor Republican parties had to clear such
a difficult hurdle to get on the ballot, and this disparity was alleged
to violate equal protection. The Court stated: "We must consider
the facts and circumstances behind the law, the interests which
the State claims to be protecting, and the interests of those who
are disadvantaged by the classification. [Citing Carrington].'-4
However, the opinion goes on to recognize that the case also
involved the right to associate freely as protected by the first
amendment. Furthermore, when a first amendment liberty is in-
fringed, the infringement can be justified only by a "compelling
42 See text accompanying notes 35-40 supra.
43 Compare Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911): "One
who assails the classification in such a law must carry the burden of showing that it does
not rest upon any reasonable basis, but is essentially arbitrary." While only economic
rights were involved under a statute restricting extraction of underground water in Lind-
sley, the same standard has been applied to voting rights. See, e.g., Drueding v. Devlin,
234 F.Supp. 721 (D. Md. 1964), aff'd mem., 380 U.S. 125 (1965).
"393 U.S. 23 (1968).
4 Id. at 30.
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state interest in the regulation of a subject within the State's
constitutional power to regulate."-46 The notion that a fundamental
right can be lawfully abridged only when there is a showing of a
compelling state interest derives from an earlier line of cases; 47
however, it had not previously been applied in the voting rights
area. 48 Nevertheless, the Williams Court found that the state had
failed to show any "compelling interest" which would justify
imposing such heavy burdens on the "right to vote and associ-
ate." 49 On this ground the Court ordered the American In-
dependent Party placed on the ballot.
Decided after Williams, Kramer v. Union Free School Dist.
No. 1550 involved a citizen's challenge to a New York statute that
prevented him from voting in a school district election because he
did not own or lease property and was not a parent of children
enrolled in school. The Court found the statute invalid as a
violation of equal protection. Mr. Chief Justice Warren wrote:
"[I]f a challenged state statute grants the right to some bona fide
residents of requisite age and citizenship and denies the franchise
to others, the Court must determine whether the exclusions are
necessary to promote a compelling state interest. [citing Carring-
ton]."5 1 Taking the matter under "exacting judicial scrunity, ' 5 2
the Court goes on to find that while the state may well have an
interest in limiting the franchise to those who are primarily
4 Id. at 31, quoting from N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963).
47 In general, the compelling state interest standard has been employed: (I) where
"fundamental rights" are involved [see, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)
(the right to travel); N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (rights of expression and
association); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (the right to procreate); Bates v.
Little 'Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960) (freedom of association)]; and (2) where "suspect
classifications" are involved [see, e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) (racial
classifications); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (racial classification);
Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (wealth as a classification)].
More often than not these "suspect classifications" call for a Harper "close scrutiny,"
rather than a compelling state interest test. An interface of these two lines of cases can be
seen in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, II (1967) (racial classification must serve an
"overriding purpose independent of invidious racial discrimination").
48 See the discussion of the standards employed in Reynolds, Harper and Carrington in
text accompanying notes 29-43 supra.
49 393 U.S. at 31 (emphasis added).
50 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
51 Id. at 627. The reference to Carrington is puzzling. The opinion in that case clearly
applies a test of reasonableness rather than compelling state interest. However, the
Kramer test is foreshadowed in the cited section of Carrington: "[Sitates may not casually
deprive a class of individuals of the vote because of some remote administrative benefit to
the State .. " 380 U.S. at 96.
52 395 U.S. at 628. Note that the Court denies the state a presumption of validity (the
same analysis as employed in Harper) and examines the rationality of the statute in light of
its goals:
[T]he deference usually given to the judgment of legislators does not extend
to decisions concerning which resident citizens may participate in the elec-
tion of legislators .... [Wlhen we are reviewing statutes which deny some
residents the right to vote, the general presumption of constitutionality
[VOL. 5:2
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affected by the consequences of the election,53 the New York
statute does not achieve even that end with sufficient precision.
Rather, it draws into the classification of included voters some
who do not have a stake in the outcome of the election, while it
excludes others who do have an interest in the election. 54
Decided the same day as Kramer, Cipriano v. City of Houma55
involved a citizen who was denied the vote in a municipal utility
system revenue bond election pursuant to a Louisiana law that
limited participation in such elections to property owners. In
applying the compelling state interest test as enunciated in Kra-
mer, the Court found that the state had "fenced out" a sector of
the population which had a valid interest in the election and that
the state had no legitimate interest in so doing.5 6 One year later, in
City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, the Court extended the holding of
Cipriano and the test used in Kramer to cover an authorization
election for municipal bonds, holding that exclusion of
non-property owners from the vote in such elections again served
no compelling state interest.5 7
In Evans v. Cornman5 8 the Court faced the problem of the
residency for voting purposes of residents of a federal enclave.
Local voter registrars in Maryland sought to exclude plaintiffs
from the polls on the ground that as residents of the National
Institutes of Health, they did not meet Maryland's residency
requirements. The Court first noted that states cannot draw lines
inconsistent with the equal protection clause, and that courts
should carefully scrutinize the purposes and interests behind such
a restriction of the franchise.5 9 In holding that Maryland's ex-
clusion of plaintiffs from the franchise was an impermissible
afforded state statutes and the traditional approval given state classifications
if the Court can conceive a 'rational basis' for the distinctions made are not
applicable....
Id. at 627- 28.
53 Id. at 632. However, the Court did not decide whether such an interest is a com-
pelling one. Id. n. 14.
54 Id. at 632. For example, appellant was excluded, even though he paid non-property
taxes which gave him an interest in the election outcome, while an unemployed person
who leased property would not be excluded, although he might not have a fiscal stake in
the outcome. Id. n. 15.
55 395 U.S. 701 (1969).
56 Id. at 705-07. The Court noted that only 40 percent of the city's registered voters
were property owners, while all residents would be affected as rate payers and ben-
eficiaires of improvements. while property owners and non-property owners may have
different interests, these interests do no afford a valid distinction in distributing the
franchise.
57 399 U.S. 204 (1970). See also Parish School Bd. v. Stewart, 400 U.S. 884, aff'g
mem. 310 F.Supp. 1172 (1970): Police Jury v. Hebert, 404 U.S. 807, rev'g mere. 258 La.
41, 245 So.2d 349 (1971).
58 398 U.S. 419 (1970).
59 Id. at 422.
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fencing out, the Court found that there were not sufficient
differences between plaintiffs and other citizens of Maryland to
justify excluding the former from the right to vote. 60
The tests and analysis employed in Kramer and the other cases
of exclusion from the franchise discussed above have carried over
into cases involving state durational residency requirements, with
most courts holding those requirements invalid.61 Affeldt v.
Whitcomb 62 is illustrative. Plaintiffs' demand to be registered by
local Indiana election officials was denied on the ground that they
had not resided in that jurisdiction for the six months required by
statute. Plaintiffs then asserted the violation of first amendment
rights 63 as well as rights sceured to them by the due process,
privileges and immunities, and equal protection clauses of the
fourteenth amendment. The court noted that such classifications
must be carefully scrutinized 64 and tested with reference to the
Kramer compelling state interest standard. 65 It then asked
whether Indiana had a compelling interest in its residency require-
ment and whether the means chosen to carry out that interest
were necessary.66 The court found that Indiana had a compelling
interest in purity of elections; 67 however, the durational residency
requirement was found not to insure that end. 68 In effect, the
Affeldt court sees the residency requirement as unnecessarily
depriving citizens of the vote without fully protecting against
60 Id. at 424-26.
61 Recent cases are collected in Andrews v. Cody, 327 F.Supp. 793, 794 (three judge
court, M.D.N.C. 1971), appeal docketed, 40 U,S.L.W. 3290 (Nov. 6, 197 1)(No. 71-628).
62 319 F.Supp. 69 (three judge court, N.D. Ind. 1970), appeal docketed, 39 U.S.L.W.
3334 (December 10, 1970) (No. 1081, 1970 Term; renumbered No. 70-51, 1971 Term). It
should be noted that the Supreme Court has twice been presented with equal protection
challenges to durational residency statutes. In Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45 (1969), the Court
dismissed a complaint as moot because plaintiffs satisfied the residency requirement in
question before their case reached the Court, and hence the Court did not squarely face
the issue. In Drueding v. Devlin, 380 U.S. 125 (1965), aff'g mem. 234 F.Supp. 721 (D.
Md. 1964), the Court dismissed a challenge to a durational residency requirement on the
ground that it was a reasLnable exercise of state power to establish qualifications for
electors.
6 The right alleged violated was that of political association. Plaintiffs also charged a
violation of their right to travel. 319 F. Supp. at 71.
64 Id. at 73.
5 Id. at 74.
66 Id. at 75-76. This interpretation of the compelling state interest standard is consid-
ered in further depth in Comment, Limitations on the Voting Franchise and the Standard
of Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15, 1970 UTAH L. REV. 143. See also
Socialist Workers Party v. Welch, 334 F.Supp. 179, 181 (S.D. Texas 197 1).
67 By "purity," the state presumably means protection against fraud in the form of
voting by persons not truly residents of the state.
68 319 F.Supp. at 76-77. The court reasoned that since a person can always swear
falsely to his residence, Indiana's presumption that those who have resided in the state are
residents does not prevent fraud. Nor does the requirement itself tend to insure an
enlightened electorate. "Indiana's six-month requirement imposes an overbroad burden
upon the right to vote." Id. at 77.
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fraud. While holding the Indiana durational residency statute in-
valid, the court noted that the Indiana closing date statute had not
been affected by the decision.6 9
While cases like Affeldt purport to employ the Kramer standard
of equal protection, a more complex test is actually used. Al-
though Kramer says that where a fundamental right such as
voting is in issue only a compelling state interest can justify its
limitation, that case and its progeny base their holdings on an
analysis that assumes the state has a compelling interest in the
restriction and then shows that the state statute is too broad to
accomplish only the allegedly compelling state interest. Thus,
nowhere do the courts consider what is a compelling state in-
terest. The narrow holding in all of these cases appears to be that
the state has swept within its franchise-denial classification some
citizens for whom the denial of the franchise does nothing to
advance the state interest involved.
B. The Rational Relation Test as Applied to
Closing Dates: Ferguson v. Williams
Although other courts have touched on the issue of voter
registration closing dates, most have not faced the issue square-
ly. 70 However, one recent federal decision, Ferguson v. Wil-
liams,7 1 confronted closing dates as a primary issue. In that case,
Mississippi's voter registration closing date statute 72 cut off regis-
tration four months before election day. Plaintiffs alleged that the
statute violated the equal protection clause under either the ra-
tional relation or compelling state interest standards. The three
judge court decided that the proper test to be used in determining
the validity of the Mississippi provision was the rational relation
test.
73
The court hinged its conclusion on a finding that Kramer and
the compelling state interest standard do not apply to all voting
rights cases. The court quoted Kramer to the effect that the
69 Id. at 78-79. Plaintiffs did not challenge the twenty-nine day closing date set forth in
IND. ANN. STAT. § 29-3412 (Supp. 1970).
70 See, e.g., Affeldt v. Whitcomb, 319 F.Supp. 69 (three judge court, N.D. Ind. 1970),
appeal docketed, 39 U.S.L.W. 3334 (December 10, 1970) (No. 1081, 1970 Term; renum-
bered No. 70-5 1, 1971 Term). Lester v. Bd. of Elections, 319 F.Supp. 505 (three judge
court, D.D.C. 1970); Beare v. Smith, 321 F.Supp. 1100 (three judge court, S.D. Texas
1971).
71 330 F.Supp. 1012 (threejudge court, N.D. Miss. 1971). On September 24, 1971, Mr.
Justice Brennan ordered registration to be continued until October 6, 197 1, and that the
votes of voters so registered be impounded until final resolution of the case. VOTER
REGISTRATION EXCHANGE, October 15, 1971, at 5.
72 MISS. CONsT. art. 12, § 251 and Miss. CODE ANN. § 3235 (1943).
73 330 F.Supp. at 1023.
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sole issue in this case is whether the additional requirements
of [the New York statute] -requiremenis which prohibit
some district residents who are otherwise qualified by age and
citizenship from participating in district meetings and school
board elections-violate the Fourteenth Amendment. .... 74
The court stated that Kramer only applies where part of the
qualified electorate is granted the franchise and another part is
denied the franchise. 75 The court found support for this narrow
view of Kramer in Howe v. Brown,76 a durational residency case
that held Kramer inapplicable to that issue and hence applied the
rational relation test. Under this analysis, the Howe court saw the
compelling state interest standard as applying only to cases where
a fencing out of qualified voters has occurred because of the
way they might vote.77
The Ferguson court found further support for this view in
Gordon v. Lance,78 a Supreme Court decision holding a West
Virginia super-majority requirement valid. In Gordon the Su-
preme Court, while not considering Kramer, implied that Cipri-
ano is very limited in its impact and that the compelling interest
standard is to be applied only to cases where an independently
identifiable group is fenced out because of the way they will
vote. 79 As a third authority for rejecting the compelling interest
test, the Ferguson court noted that in Oregon v. Mitchell,80 where
the Supreme Court considered the validity of congressional legis-
lation lowering the voting age, the Court did not employ the
compelling state interest test. 8 ' The Ferguson court then con-
cluded that the compelling state interest test applies only to cases
involving the fencing out of voters, 82  whereas here no in-
dependently identifiable group has been excluded.8 3 Hence the
compelling interest test is inapplicable.8 4
74 Id. at 1020. It seems that even this language applies to closing dates. Plaintiffs in
Ferguson were otherwise qualified, and the only issue concerned the additional require-
ment of the statute, that is, registration before the closing date.
75 Even under this formulation, plaintiffs have been prevented from voting while other
citizens with similar qualifications have been permitted. However, it might be assumed that
by the language, "granting the franchise to the electorate," the court means that plaintiffs
have been granted the franchise but have simply chosen not to use it in a timely fashion.
76 319 F.Supp. 862 (three judge court, N.D. Ohio 1970).
77 Id. at 866-67.
78403 U.S. 1 (1971).
79 Id. at 5.
80400 U.S. 112 (1970).
1" 330 F.Supp. at 1022. The issue in Mitchell was, of course, congressional power to
enact such legislation, not the validity of state action in this respect.
82 330 F.Supp. at 1022-23.
83 Id. at 1023.
84 The court realized that the choice of tests is outcome determinative. Id. at 1019.
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Under the rational relation test the court reasoned that it only
need find "any state of facts [which could] reasonably ... be
conceived" 8 5 to justify Mississippi's closing date in order to sus-
tain the statute. The court then looked to the reasons which the
state offered in support of its closing date and noted that
up-to-date and accurate registration records had to be compiled
before the election. This task alone, according to defendants,
required four to six weeks in Mississippi, due to the flood of
"last-minute" registrants. While the state has an interest in hear-
ing registration appeals and checking voter qualifications during
the closing period, it can be inferred that the most persuasive
reason for closing dates is the preparation of accurate registration
lists up-dated to reflect new registrants and the deletion of citizens
no longer qualified to vote for whatever reason.8 6 Having found
that Mississippi had reasonably persuasive reasons for imposing a
closing date, the court concluded that the statute was not arbitrary
and did not deny plaintiffs equal protection of the laws.8 7
As the court concluded, the validity of closing dates seems to
depend largely on which equal protection standard is used.88
Where the rational relation test is applied, the classification is
presumed to be reasonable and the challenger has the burden of
showing that it is arbitrary or unreasonable.89 This saddles a
plaintiff with the extremely heavy burden of proving, for example,
that the legislature has been arbitrary in adopting a one month
rather than a one week closing date. However, when the com-
pelling state interest test is applied, the state must demonstrate
overriding reasons to justify its classifications.90 This would seem
to require more than a conclusory legislative finding that a given
closing period was necessary.
C. The Compelling State Interest Test as Applied
to Closing Dates: Beare v. Smith
The standards developed in Kramer and its progeny were ap-
plied to a case involving voter registration closing dates in Beare
v. Smith.91 Texas required annual re-registration of voters and
85 Id. at 1023.86 Id. at 1023-24.
87 Id.
88 See note 84 supra.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 321 F.Supp. 1100 (three judge court, S.D. Texas 1971). Doty argues that the court
could have found the re-registration requirement unconstitutional as a deprivation of the
right to vote without due process of law. Doty, supra note 1, at 199-201. For a discussion
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also provided that registration would be open only from October 1
to January 3 1, covering the elections in the twelve month period
beginning the following March 1. Plaintiffs sought and were de-
nied registration after January 3 1. They asserted in federal district
court that the closing date and annual re-registration together
created an unconstitutional obstacle to their free exercise of the
franchise. The court here noted the disfranchising effect of the
Texas system was such that these requirements prevented over a
million Texans from voting.92 The court reasoned that the Texas
registration system must be invalid unless the state could demon-
strate that it served a compelling state interest. 93
Texas first argued that its goal was insuring "purity of the
ballot," since only those interested and informed would be able to
vote. 94 The court responded that Texas cannot unduly restrict the
vote to achieve other goals. 95 Texas secondly argued that it had a
compelling state interest in the prevention of election fraud.96 The
court fully agreed with the validity of such an interest, but opined
that less drastic solutions could be formulated to meet that need.97
It concluded that the restrictions Texas imposed on the avail-
ability of the franchise in the form of annual re-registration and an
effective nine month closing date attempted to promote state
interests in an unnecessarily heavy-handed manner and as such
violated equal protection. 98
Beare indicates that the Kramer standards are applicable to
of the case from the perspective of a political scientist, see, Burnham, A Political Scientist
and Voting-Rights Litigation: The Case of the 1966 Texas Registration Statute, 1971
WASH. U. L. Q. 335.
92 See note 14 supra.
93 The court here follows the compelling state interest standard as set forth in Kramer v.
Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969), Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395
U.S. 701 (1969), and the early durational residency cases, Hadnott v. Amos, 320 F.Supp.
107 (three judge court, M.D. Ala. 1970), appeal docketed, 39 U.S.L.W. 3289 (Dec. 21,
1970) (No. 1139, 1970 Term; renumbered No. 70-59, 1971 Term), and Blumstein v.
Ellington, C.A. 5815 (three judge court, M.D. Tenn. Aug. 31, 1970), prob. juris, noted, 39
U.S.L.W. 3375 (Mar. 1, 1971) (No. 769, 1970 Term; renumbered No. 70- 13, 1971 Term).
94 321 F.Supp. at 1105-06.
9- Id. at 1106-07, citing Reynolds v, Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
96 321 F.Supp. at 1107.
97 While the court does not consider what these less drastic solutions might be, a
reasonable alternative that Texas might formulate could include permanent registration
with a shorter closing period and more comprehensive checks against fraud. See Doty,
supra note 1, at 204- 05.
This less restrictive alternative approach used by the court is considered in connection
with Affeldt v. Whitcomb, discussed in note 62 supra and accompanying text. An elucida-
tion of this approach as it flows out of Kramer can be found in Comment, Limitations on
the Voting Franchise and the Standard of Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15,
supra note 66.
98 321 F.Supp. at 1107. While the court does not cite authority for its conclusion other
than Blumstein v. Ellington, C.A. 5815 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 31, 1970), prob.juris. noted, 39
U.S.L.W. 3375 (Mar. 1, 197 1) (No. 769, 1970 Term; renumbered No. 70-13, 1971 Term),
its analysis suggests that employed in considering an overly broad statute. See text
accompanying note 62 supra.
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areas outside that of property ownership restrictions on the fran-
chise. However, two factors qualify any conclusion that Beare
stands for the principle that Kramer applies to closing dates.
First, the Texas annual re-registration statute was adopted as a
successor to a constitutionally invalid poll tax, and the court was
well aware of this? 9 Second, the court fails to distinguish between
the two aspects of the system, that is, re-registration and the
lengthy closing period. It is uncertain then if the outcome would
be the same were the court to consider closing dates alone.
D. Resolution of the Conflict? Gordon v. Lance
The issue posed by the constitutionality of closing dates has
been resolved differently by the two federal courts which have
directly faced it. Beare v. Smith held that a closing date included
in a larger restrictive system conflicted with the equal protection
clause; this finding necessarily relies on an expansive reading of
Kramer by applying it to all voting rights cases. On the other
hand, the opinion in Ferguson v. Williams upholds a closing date
by distinguishing Kramer and limiting that case to its narrow
facts. This latter approach appears to be the one favored by the
Supreme Court as evidenced by its recent decision in Gordon v.
Lance.100 The issue there was whether a West Virginia require-
ment that state political subdivisions could not increase their
indebtedness beyond certain levels without the approval of 60
percent of the voters violated equal protection by causing the
votes of dissenters to be weighed more heavily than the votes of
electors favoring approval. Relying on Cipriano v. City of
Houma,10 1 the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held this
super-majority requirement unconstitutional. 102 The Supreme
Court reversed, finding the West Virginia court's reliance on
Cipriano inappropriate.103 Cipriano was
no more than a reassertion of the principle, consistently rec-
99321 F.Supp. at 1100, 1103.
100403 U.S. I (1971), discussed in text accompanying note 78 supra. Although the
Gordon Court does not discuss the merits of judicial involvement with state electoral
processes, a persuasive case for the Court's withdrawal from this area is made by
Justice Harlan in his separate opinion in Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 165 (197 1).
101 395 U.S. 701 (1969), discussed in text accompanying note 55 supra.
102 153 W.Va. 559, 170 S.E.2d 783 (1969).
103 The West Virginia majority found Cipriano "in point because it dealt with a local
election and the rights of voters in an election dealing with the issuance of municipal bonds
as distinguished from an election to nominate or elect public officials." Id. at 570, 170
S.E.2d at 789. In a dissenting opinion, the president of the West Virginia court vigorously
rejected the tack taken by his colleagues:
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ognized, that an individual may not be denied access to the
ballot because of some extraneous condition such as race ...
[Gomillion] ... wealth [Harper]... tax status [Kramer] or
military status [Carrington].10 4
The Court found the West Virginia scheme consistent with the
equal protection clause on the ground that the state had not
picked out a " 'discrete and insular minority' for special treat-
ment."105 Cipriano, n0 6 then, appears merely to stand for the prop-
osition that when a state attempts to fence out a certain sector of
citizens the normal rational relation standard of equal protection
does not apply. 10 7 By logical inference Gordon v. Lance may
stand for the proposition that the compelling state interest test will
not be applied to all cases dealing with the right to vote but will be
limited to cases where the traditional suspect classification is
involved, 0 8 where a fundamental right has been infringed, 0 9 or
where a state has acted to discriminate "against any identifiable
class."' 1 0 Viewed in the light cast by Gordon, Kramer and its
progeny do not really articulate a new and more rigorous equal
protection standard applicable to all cases involving voting. Rath-
er, Harper and Carrington are cases involving traditional suspect
classifications; Williams v. Rhodes involved a traditional funda-
mental right;1 1 ' and Kramer, Cipriano, Phoenix, and Evans can
be seen as either involving other suspect classifications or repre-
senting a third area for application of the compelling interest test
where the classification has the effect of fencing out an identifiable
class of potential voters.' 12 Assuming that this analysis is correct,
The majority opinion cites and relies on [Carrington] ... [Kramer] ...
[Cipriano].... Each of these is utterly inapplicable to the case at bar.
.I can detect not even a remote connection between the question of
authorization of an issue of municipal bonds at a local election and the
applicability or the non-applicability of the one person-one vote principle in
evaluating the votes cast at such an election and, as already indicated, that
question was not involved or considered in the election dealt with in the
Cipriano case.
Id. at 594, 596, 170 S.E.2d at 801-03.
104403 U.S. at 5.
105 Id.
106 And, by implication, Kramer as well. See text accompanying notes 71-90 supra,
considering Ferguson v. Williams.
107 This is the conclusion reached in Ferguson.
10s See, e.g., note 47 supra.
109 The Gordon Court ignores the often stated proposition that voting is a fundamental
right. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964). Perhaps the Court is intimating
that only first amendment rights are fundamental enough to warrant application of the
compelling interest test.
110403 U.S. 1, 7 (1971).
111 The right of free political association.
112 To this general effect, see also Mr. Justice Stewart's dissent in Kramer, 395 U.S.
621, 639 (1969). There are two problems in drawing this inference as to the relationship
between these cases from Gordon v. Lance: (1) It seems to ignore some of the language in
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the court in Ferguson v. Williams properly relies on Gordon v.
Lance in holding that the compelling state interest test will not be
applied to voter registration closing dates. 113 Because access to
the polls is open to all, provided they act in a timely fashion, voter
registration closing dates do not fence out any identifiable group.
This is to be distinguished from the case where access to the polls
is denied an independently identifiable group such as non-property
owners. Since with closing dates there is no fencing out and the
state clearly has some rational reasons for its closing date, a court
would have to uphold such a statute.
It should be noted that Gordon v. Lance does more than
suggest how the Supreme Court might view the issue of closing
dates; it also anticipates a withdrawal from the expansive lan-
guage used in Kramer. Applying the Kramer compelling state
interest test to all voting rights cases would further embroil the
Court in regulating state electoral processes. Thus, limiting the
Kramer standard to cases of fencing out would surely appeal to a
Court intent upon avoiding further involvement in the electoral
process.
Nevertheless, even assuming that Gordon has no bearing on
the issue of voter registration closing dates, there are other rea-
sons why the compelling state interest test may not apply to
closing dates. First, note that in Kramer, while the Court dis-
cusses the compelling interest test, it grounds its decision on the
fact that the New York statute was not sufficiently precise to
advance the state interest in limiting the franchise to those primar-
ily interested without in fact excluding citizens who likely were
interested and had a stake in the outcome. 1 4 The same is true
with respect to Phoenix"15 and Cipriano"6 to the extent that they
Kramer and other cases implying a broad use of the compelling state interest test in voting
rights cases. See, e.g., 395 U.S. 621, 627-28 (1969). (2) There is a seeming lack of
relevance of Cipriano and similar cases to the Gordon v. Lance problem. This is keenly
highlighted by the dissenting opinion in the state court. See note 103 supra. If Cipriano has
no relevance, the construction given it by the Supreme Court could be dictum.
113 However, one could still argue that the Ferguson Court misapplied the compelling
interest test in holding it inapplicable to closing dates because: (I) the super-majority
requirement at issue in Gordon v. Lance is factually distinguishable from closing dates; (2)
Gordon v. Lance construes Cipriano but does not consider Kramer or the basic standards
laid out in that opinion, an opinion that implies that its teaching would apply to most voting
cases, presumably including closing dates (see 396 U.S. 621 at 627); and (3) the case fails
to consider the broader proposition that a fundamental right can be abridged only upon a
showing of a compelling state interest (see note 47 supra).
114 395 U.S. at 633.
115 399 U.S. at 209- 14. In view of the goals sought to be advanced by requiring
property ownership as a condition to voting (e.g., promoting an informed and interested
electorate by insuring that voters have a stake in the outcome of the election), the
differences between property owners and non-property owners were not sufficient to
justify denying the latter the franchise.
116 395 U.S. at 706: "The challenged statute contains a classification which excludes
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involve statutes which unnecessarily exclude some identifiable
group of voters. Arguably then, the compelling state interest test
may be only surplusage added on to what is in fact a variant of the
traditional rational relationship analysis as it applies to voting
cases, a variant because the Court meticulously scrutinizes the
classification and places the burden of proof upon the state to
justify the classification as one reasonably calculated to serve the
state's interest without unnecessarily restricting exercise of the
franchise by any voter.
A second reason why the compelling state interest test may not
apply to closing dates even if Gordon has no bearing on the issue
is seen in McDonald v. Bd. of Election Comm'rs.117 The Court
distinguished its holding in Kramer'1 8 on the ground that Kramer
involved an absolute denial of the franchise whereas McDonald
involved a situation where only some citizens encountered greater
difficulty in voting than did others. 119
Confronted with a constitutional challenge to a particular
state's closing date, a court must decide as a threshhold matter
what standard of equal protection to apply. The voting rights
cases teach that voting is a fundamental right any infringement of
which must be meticulously scrutinized. At the same time, the
compelling interest test seems to be a singularly inappropriate
standard. Narrowly restricted as regards voting by the Gordon
case, it is too meagerly developed to serve as anything more than
an outcome determinative shibboleth in the closing date context.
The rational basis test is the only proven analytical standard left
to the court.
The rational basis test to be applied, however, is not the tradi-
tional one. Instead of hypothesizing any state of affairs wherein
the time gap between the closing of registration and election day
would serve a valid purpose, the court should require the state to
carry the burden of proving it is in fact using the period
following the closing date to serve the state interest asserted.
As applied to closing dates, such a legal analysis strikes a
balance between the interests involved. It recognizes that the
state has an interest in closing dates as well as that the individual
otherwise qualified voters who are as substantially affected and directly interested in the
matter voted upon as are those who are permitted to vote."
'17 394 U.S. 802 (1969). The Court held that a provision in the Illinois absentee ballot
system denying absentee ballots to citizens incarcerated in jail while awaiting trial does not
violate the equal protection clause. Note that McDonald was decided before Kramer.
118 395 U.S. at 626- 27 n. 6.
"1 But cf. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968), discussed in text accompanying note
44 suprawhere the compelling state interest test was applied in a case where exercise of a
fundamental right was only made more difficult for some citizens than for others.
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has an interest in free access to the polls. Applying this frame-
work to the facts of the particular case before it, the court will be
able to determine whether citizens are unnecessarily deprived of
their right to vote. Using this standard legal framework, it is
conceivable that variations in conditions between jurisdictions
will result in different findings of constitutionality with respect to
an identical time period.
I!l. THE STATE INTEREST IN CLOSING DATES
Although the standard of equal protection to be applied to
closing dates is an open question, a court will in any event be
required to make a factual inquiry into what interests the state has
in closing dates. This inquiry is necessary regardless of the test
applied.
The first state interest in having a closing date is the enforce-
ment of voter qualifications. A state may establish certain
non-discriminatory qualifications for the exercise of the fran-
chise. 120 Typical are restrictions that minors and felons cannot
vote, and that only those who are bona fide residents of a political
subdivision (for example, state or county) may exercise the fran-
chise. Assuming that these are valid objectives, the state uses
registration, and closing dates in particular, as a means of achiev-
ing them; the time between the closing date and election day
theoretically can be used to investigate qualifications and allow
for the resolution of disputes.
Second, registration serves a seemingly legitimate state interest
in preventing persons from fraudulently voting more than once. 12'
At least, in theory, closing dates offer a period in which to ascer-
tain whether a citizen is registered to vote at more than one place.
Third, and perhaps most important, registration closing dates
assist in the administration of the registration system itself. It is
argued that public officials must have time in which to compile
corrected lists of qualified voters for distribution to local polling
places. 2 2 Voter registration lists are the practical key to insuring
purity of the ballot and are the essence of a voter registration
system. 123
120 See text accompanying notes 16- 19 supra.
121 See, e.g., Ferguson v. Williams, 330 F.Supp. 1012, 1023 (1971); Lester v. Bd. of
Elections, 319 F.Supp. 505, 509 (three judge court, D.D.C. 1970).
122 Ferguson v. Williams, 330 F.Supp. 1012, 1017, 1023-24 (1971).
123 If the purpose of voter registration systems is to insure that only qualified voters are
permitted to vote, necessarily a record must be kept of those who are qualified. These
registration lists are then distributed to polling places where a citizen attempting to vote is
identified by the registration list.
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Assuming that a court views one or more of these state in-
terests as legitimate and that it applies a variant of the rational
basis test,1 24 the question then becomes whether the closing date
which the state has established unnecessarily excludes a number
of otherwise qualified voters, or whether the closing date excludes
these voters only to the extent necessary to serve the state's
interest.
In Kramer, the court said that the New York statute restricting
the franchise in school board elections to parents of children
attending school and property owners or lessees was invalid on
the ground that the statute needlessly excluded citizens who may
well have an interest in such elections. The Court said that while
New York may have an interest in excluding those citizens not
affected by the election, it excluded many who were in fact
affected by the election.' 25 The state had not tailored its statute
"with sufficient precision to justify denying appellant the fran-
chise." 126 The Court applied similar reasoning in Cipriano127 and
Phoenix. 28 From this it can be concluded that at least in these
three cases the Court felt that the state's interest, whether or not
compelling, should be accomplished by means less restrictive of
the right to vote.
Applying this mode of analysis to closing dates yields a similar
conclusion. Clearly the state has interests to be served. But the
precise issue is whether a less drastic means might accomplish the
same end. 129 With closing dates, an ad hoc approach will be
necessary, but the legal test should be the same in all instances.
Thus the state will be required to show that the exclusion of
citizens from the franchise is demonstrably reasonable to advance
important state interests. If, in light of local demography and
technology, less restrictive alternatives are feasible, courts will
require that the state resort to such alternatives.13 0 In each case, a
124 See text accompanying notes 114- 116 supra and text following note 119 supra.
125 395 U.S. at 630-33.
126 Id. at 632.
127 Id. at 704-06. See note 116 supra.
128 399 U.S. at 209- 13. See note 115 supra.
129 See Affeldt v. Whitcomb, 319 F.Supp. 69 (three judge court, N.D. Ind. 1970),
appeal docketed, 39 U.S.L.W. 3334 (December 10, 1970), discussed in text accompanying
notes 62-69 supra, for an application of this analysis.
130 One aspect of this factual inquiry by the court would be what technology is in use
locally that could be brought to bear on voter registration systems. In some areas modern
technological advances are being currently applied on the municipal level to voter registra-
tion with promising results, particularly in shortening the time required to maintain regis-
tration files. See Pentworthy, Computerized Voter Registration, THE AMERICAN CITY,
Nov. 1967, vol. 82, at 78; Murphy, Data Processing Speeds the Election Process, THE
AMERICAN CITY, May, 1967, vol. 82, at 100. For a general overview of current uses of
data processing in municipal government, see K. KRAEMER & G. HOWE, AUTOMATED




court will be able to sustain a closing date that excluded citizens
only if such exclusion is in fact necessary. Outside the pure
fencing out cases, such an analysis is more viable than a pure
test of compelling state interest; nevertheless, it still recognizes
the special importance of the right to vote. In practical terms, the
state will be under pressure to restrict its closing dates to a
demonstrably reasonable period. Yet it will not be under the
burden of continually putting forward a compelling interest to
justify any restriction of the franchise.
Alternatively, a court may elect not to apply a variant of the
rational basis test discussed above, but rather to apply the com-
pelling state interest test. 131 Since the courts have not defined a
compelling state interest, it is difficult to say, for example, that
although a state has an overriding interest in a seven day closing,
its interest in a thirty day closing is insufficiently compelling. The
difficulty in distinguishing between a state's interests in having
registration close on election day itself, one week in advance, or
one month in advance itself suggests that the simple compelling
state interest standard, as an outcome-determinative shibboleth, is
both intellectually and logically untenable in the closing date
context. This difficulty in differentiating between these periods
may suggest that the only judicial alternative under the compelling
state interest test is the choice of either validating or invalidating
all closing dates. This suggests that a more traditional requirement
that states trim their restrictions on availability of the franchise to
the bare minimum may be more appropriate in considering the
validity of closing dates. 132 Thus, the compelling state interest test
as enunciated in Kramer may be either bare rhetoric concealing
the variant of the rational basis test discussed above or too radical
a tool to be applied to closing dates. 133
IV. LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS
If courts are either unwilling or unable to remedy the large
scale disfranchisement resulting from voter registration closing
dates, the only recourse short of a constitutional amendment lies
in legislative action. As suggested above, closing dates bring into
conflict the individual's interest in free access to the polls and the
131 See text accompanying note 51 supra, for a formulation of the broadly construed
compelling state interest test.
132 See, e.g., the analysis used in Affeldt v. Whitcomb, discussed in text accompanying
notes 62-69 supra.
133 See, e.g., the interpretation given the standard in Howe v. Brown, 319 F.Supp. 862,
869 (three judge court, N.D. Ohio 1970).
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state's interest in elections that are orderly and free from fraud.
Because of its superior ability to gather pertinent information and
use it to remedy a narrowly defined problem, the legislature,
acting pursuant to constitutional standards, may well be better
equipped to reconcile these competing interests than the judiciary.
Two possible approaches are available. First, action could be
taken at the state level to reduce the duration of closing periods.
Such an attempt, presumably on the order of a uniform act, could
be made part of a more general reform of the voting registration
system. Some lobbying attempts have already been made to en-
courage state legislatures to adopt a nation-wide seven day min-
imum closing date.13 4 The advantages in state action are twofold:
first, the federal government is not drawn into what is traditionally
an area of state concern. 135 Second, it allows the state to fit its
legislation to peculiar needs.136 Concomitant with the first point is
the notion that state action avoids any possibility of invasion of
privacy 137 or political abuses' 38 that might be connected with a
centralized federal registration system.' 3 9 On the other hand,
such legislation might merely further the already existing patch-
work of election laws. It is also likely that since the size of the
electorate is a politically volatile issue,' 40 any legislation in this
area would be difficult to pass.
Second, although Congress might abolish or limit state registra-
tion closing dates, congressional power may be restricted to
elections for federal offices.' 4 ' Article 1, section 4, allowing Con-
134 The public interest lobbying organization Common Cause is attempting to establish a
seven day closing by means of action aimed at state legislatures. N.Y. Times, February 9,
1971, at 9, col. 1.
135 Any federal activity here necessarily withdraws this area from state control, possibly
at the sacrifice of some ideals of federalism.
136 Differences in population and geographic variables between states are probably of
great importance in administering a voter registration system in that they largely control
the numbers of potential voters per registration office. Necessarily, these differences would
lead to pressures to deviate from any uniformity attempted by a uniform act.
137 See, e.g., N.Y. Times, October 13, 1971, at 21, col. I.
138 Id. See also N.Y. Times, October 29, 1971, at 21, col. 1.
139 Whether realistic or not, the argument to be presented against a national registry of
voters is that in having one registry rather than fifty, the possibility of abuse of the
information stored increases greatly.
140 The political impact of such legislation would likely be more drastic than that of
previous uniform acts such as the Uniform Commercial Code, in that effectively it
directly regulates the size and composition of the electorate. There is some intimation that
voter registration reform might make voting easier for the poor and minority groups in
particular. See N.Y. Times, October 11, 1971, at 21, col. 2; N.Y. Times, October 13,
1971, at 21, col. I; also Kelley, supra note 4. The Kelley group has also found data
indicating that the composition as well as the size of the electorate are functions of
registration systems. Id. at 368-69.
141 In Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1971), the Court held that Congress' power to
lower the voting age to eighteen was valid only as it applies to federal elections. The Court
also considered section 202 of the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, 42 U.S.C.
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gress to regulate the time, place and manner of elections, clearly.
applies to federal elections only. Congressional action on closing
dates as they apply to state and local elections would have to be
based on other authority. 142 To date, bills on this issue have
applied only to elections for federal officers,'143 and therefore it
might be inferred that Congress believes that its power in regu-
lating elections extends no further than federal elections. How-
ever, were it to legislate in this area, albeit reaching only federal
elections, the administrative inconvenience in maintaining dual
registration systems might force the states to bring their systems
into accord with the federal model.' 44
V. CONCLUSION
This article has sought to consider the legal issue presented by
voter registration closing dates. In effect, closing dates act to
disfranchise voters both by acting as durational residency require-
ments in some situations and by creating a procedural hurdle that
deters registration. Taken together, these facets of closing dates
prevent many citizens from registering and voting.
Traditionally, the power to regulate elections has been in the
state, and this power was circumscribed as a constitutional matter
by a test of rationality. As a result, a qualification or procedure
would not violate equal protection unless it could be shown to be
§ 1973 (1970), and concluded that Congress did have the power to reduce durational
residency requirements in elections for President and Vice-President. Mr. Justice Stewart
noted in his separate opinion that this could also be extended to congressional elections.
400 U.S. 112, 287 (1970). Six of the justices based their decision on this issue on the right
to travel interstate and the enforcement clause of the fourteenth amendment. Whether
Congress could deal with closing dates in a similar fashion is uncertain, for the issue of
closing dates does not draw the right to travel into play except in the limited fashion in
which closing dates operate as de facto durational residency requirements. See note 7
supra. However, Congress might have power to deal with closing dates in federal and state
elections through its power to make substantive definitions of equal protection. See
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
142 The enforcement power of the fourteenth amendment might provide this authority,
but Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1971), leaves this question unanswered.
143See, e.g., S. 2456, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) (establishing a Universal Voter
Registration Administration, registration by mail, and a thirty day closing period); H.R.
10442, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971) (establishing a federal registration system under the
Social Security Administration); S. 2445, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971) (providing for
federal registration through the Internal Revenue Service); H.R. 10496, 92d Cong., Ist
Sess. (1971) (establishing a thirty day closing period); H.R. 7213, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
(197 1) (abolishing durational residency requirements for federal elections and providing for
a thirty day closing); H.R. 9979, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971) (providing for registration
and residence requirements in elections for President and Vice President); S. 2596, 92d
Cong., Ist Sess. (197 1) (providing for a thirty day durational residency requirement and
closing date in congressional elections).
144 Compare the impetus that the 1970 Voting Rights Act Amendments, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973 (1970), as interpreted in Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970), gave to the
adoption of the twenty-sixth amendment.
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arbitrary or unreasonable. With the voting rights cases of the
1960's, the presumption of validity shifted away from state re-
strictions on the franchise, and the property ownership cases
make it appear that the state could restrict access to the franchise
only upon a positive showing of a compelling interest. At first
glance this analysis would also seem to apply to procedural re-
quirements like closing dates. However, some recent cases have
indicated that the compelling interest analysis may be very limited
in its applications. Under the traditional analysis, a state would
almost surely prevail in upholding its closing date; under the new
analysis which posits that the state can only restrict the right to
vote by showing a compelling interest, the answer is uncertain.
Since it is uncertain that courts will or should remedy this large
scale disfranchisement, there may exist an opportunity for reme-
dial legislation at the federal level if the states do not act. With
closing dates, as with many of our other crazy-quilt election laws,
a remedy to this roadblock would go far in maintaining one of the
most important theoretical precepts of our democratic system,
citizen control of government by the electoral process.
-Jeffrey M. Petrash
APPENDIX
Voter Registration Closing Dates
STATE CLOSING DATEt STATUTE
Alabama 10 days* ALA. CODE tit. 17,
§ 27(2) (1958)
Alaska 14 days (in person), ALASKA STAT.
30 days (by mail) § 15.07.040 (1962)
Arizona 2 months prior to ARIZ. REV. STAT.
primary, ANN. § 16-107 (1956),
8th Monday prior to as amended, (Supp.
general election (1971)












Opens 6th week prior
to election, closes 4th
week prior to election*
STATUTE
CAL. ELECTIONS CODE ANN.
§ 203 (West 1961)
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 49-4-2 (1963)
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 9-17 (1967), as
amended, (Supp. 197 1)













DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
15, § 1105 (1953), as
amended, (Supp. 1970)


















ch. 46, § 4-6 (Smith-
Hurd 1965), as amended,
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1972)
IND. ANN. STAT.
§ 29-3407 (1969), as
















Maine Open for limited periods
at different times de-
pending on size of city




3 1 days (state and
national),



















47.32 (1949), as amended,
(Supp. 1971)
KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 25-2311 (Supp. 1971)
Ky. REV. STAT.
§ 117.620 (1971)
LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 18:170 (1969)
ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 21, § 631 (1964),
as amended, (Supp. 1972)
MD. ANN. CODE art.
33, § 3-8 (1957), as
amended, (Supp. 1971)
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch.
51, § 26 (1971)
MICH. CoMP. LAWS






art. 12, § 251;
MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 3235 (1956), as
amended, (Supp. 1971)
















30 days in national
elections,
40 days in all other
elections
2nd Friday prior to
election
6th Saturday prior to
general election

















N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 55:5 (1970)
N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 19:31-6 (1964), as
amended, (Supp. 1971)
N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 3-4-8 (1953), as
amended, (Supp. 1971)
N.Y. ELECTION LAW
§§ 354, 355 (McKinney,
1964), as amended, (McKinney
Supp. 1971)
N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 163-67 (Supp. 1971)
none
OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3503.11 (Page 1960).
as amended, (Page Supp. 1970)
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
26, §§ 74, 101(b),
102.3, 103.5 (1955),
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STATUTE
Pennsylvania 50 days*
Rhode Island 60 days
South Carolina 30 days
















PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
25, §§ 951-16, 623-17
(1963), as amended,
(Supp. 1971)
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN.
§ 17-9-3 (1969)
S.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 23-63, 23-66 (1962),
as amended, (Supp. 1971)
S.D. COMP. LAWS





art. 5.11 (a) (1967),
conditionally amended,
Acts 1970, ch. 287,
§§ 3, 24
UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 20-2-6 (1955), as
amended, (Supp. 1970)
VT. STAT. ANN. tit.

























t In days previous to election day unless otherwise noted.
* These states impose other significant restrictions on the times available for registra-
tion.
STATE
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